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Financial diﬃculties of U.S. cities have recently become a major issue of
concern. However, there is little agreement on why certain cities experience
crises while others do not. Two arguments are put forward: Cities suﬀer
from (1) structural problems like high immigration, congestion etc. (2) non-
structural political problems like the weakness of the mayor, union-power etc.
Starting from a common pool model of municipal goods we estimate demand
equations for spending and debt with structural variables. The estimation is
based on 900 US cities in 1985, 1991 and 1999. Structural factors predicted by
the model explain most of the variation of spending and debt levels. Further-
more coeﬃcients are stable over time. However, excessively high debt burdens
as indicators of potential crisis, and high spending levels are outliers and not
explained by structural factors.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal distress and crises have become issues of considerable concern for U.S. states
and cities. Mayors ask for state aid to compensate for revenue short falls (The
Economist May 22nd, 2003) and (Herbert January 16, 2003). Some argue that
New York City now faces the worst ﬁscal crisis since the mid-1970 (Cooper May
7, 2003). In Oregon, school districts consider shortening the school year to avoid
large deﬁcits. Even states are aﬀected by the ﬁscal distress and lay oﬀ employees.
While media coverage of ﬁscal distress and crises is substantial, systematic evidence
on determinants of crises and, at an earlier stage, distress is quite scarce.
The present paper investigates the determinants of ﬁscal distress in 900 U.S.
cities in the mid 1980s, early 1990s and late 1990s. Since no systematic data-set on
the occurrence of ﬁscal crises in U.S. cities exists, we identify cities in ﬁscal crises
with a cluster analysis. The cluster of cities with a high debt-per-capita level is in
state of distress, while low debt-per-capita levels are a sign of ﬁscal health. We argue
that ﬁscal distress is a situation from which ﬁscal crisis is likely to result. Potential
determinants of ﬁscal distress are derived from a common pool resource model. In
this model, the budget of a city is considered to be a pool from which the inhabitants
of a city want to get as many services as possible. Since many services beneﬁt only
limited groups, while the burden of ﬁnancing is spread on all tax payers through
the common budget, voters will demand more than they would if they incorporated
the full cost of the service. Thus, spending will be higher than in the case of an
optimal planner. In an intertemporal setting, it is shown that the common pool
problem will in addition lead to higher debt levels.2 The degree of the common
pool resource problem is operationalized by structural factors such as economic
performance and socio-demographic characteristics. As these characteristics vary
across cities, expenditure and debt of cities will be diﬀerent. We empirically test
the model and show that cross-city variation of spending and debt is well explained
by the model. In a second step, we assess the importance of the factors identiﬁed
by the model to explain extreme ﬁscal outcomes of crises.
Views on what constitutes a ﬁscal crisis are diverging in the literature.3 Inman
2A large political economy literature investigates debt accumulation at a country level, for
surveys see Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Woo (2003). In contrast, Barro (1979) explains the
accumulation of public debt in a neoclassical model by a now standard tax-smoothing argument.
Sustained accumulation of debt can, however, not be explained by his model.
3Honadle (2003) in a survey of State auditors ﬁnds that only 10 States have a formal deﬁnition
of crises, 21 States made clear that their states do not deﬁne ﬁscal crises in any way. 36 States
reported that they had cities in a crises recently. McConnel and Picker (1993) discuss municipal
bankruptcy from a legal point of view.3
(1995) deﬁnes a ﬁscal crisis as a situation when a city’s potential to raise revenues
is insuﬃcient to cover the city’s legally required expenditures. Case studies have
shown that a ﬁscal crisis is usually characterized by the refusal of lenders to give
any additional credit. In the case of Philadelphia, the lenders of the city government
refused further credit, since part of the credit was to be used to repay accumulated
debt. The refusal to give further credit to a local government certainly constitutes
an important criterion for ﬁscal crises.
The credit worthiness of a city is evaluated among others on the basis of the debt
burden. The city of New York ran current account (as opposed to capital account)
deﬁcits for more than ten years before the outbreak of their crisis and accumulated
a large debt burden. Lenders then stopped to give further credit and a ﬁscal crisis
resulted. As Capeci (1991, 1994) shows, the interest rate charged for newly issued
bonds reacts to the current ﬁscal stance of a city, most notably to the borrowing
and debt level. Higher debt levels result in higher nominal interest rates, reﬂecting
the increased default risk. Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom (1995) also argue that
the probability of default is an increasing function of the absolute debt level and
the interest payment. They ﬁnd empirical support for this hypotheses for a sample
of American States. Debt levels are therefore a good indicator of ﬁscal distress of
a city as also argued by (Fuchs 1992, p. 30) and (Clark 1994). Ultimately long
lasting ﬁscal distress can lead to a ﬁscal crisis. Thus, ﬁscal crises can be identiﬁed
empirically by looking for cities with very high debt burdens.
Following the period of ﬁscal crises in the mid-1970s, numerous papers have in-
vestigated the determinants of ﬁscal crises. Most of these papers are case studies
of single cities. For example Gramlich (1976) and Shefter (1992) study the crisis
of New York in 1975, Inman (1995) studies the case of Philadelphia in 1990. The
case studies usually emphasize a combination of factors to be responsible for the
crisis. On the one hand, changes in socio-economic conditions are mentioned. On
the other hand, speciﬁc political actors (e.g., a mayor) are seen to be at the root of
the problem. In a series of articles, Bradbury (1982, 1983a, and 1983b) investigates
ﬁscal distress and its causes in a number of major American cities. Bradbury (1982)
distinguishes two types of ﬁscal distress. The ﬁrst relates to the city government’s
short-run diﬃculty in balancing its budget. The second is labelled ”Citizens’s ﬁs-
cal distress” and measures bad performance in providing adequate services. It is
mostly determined by structural factors outside of the control of city oﬃcials. Brad-
bury (1983a) calls this structural ﬁscal distress. Besides these structural factors,
city management and unmeasured costs determine ﬁscal diﬃculties of a city. Fuchs
(1992) compares the ﬁscal policies of New York City and Chicago. Chicago avoided4
ﬁscal instability in 19754 while NYC did not. This diﬀerence, in the view of Fuchs
(1992), can be attributed to the role of politics, especially the role of local party
organization. ”New York mayors were unable to centralize authority over the bud-
get process(...). Without a strong party organization New York mayors relied on
interest group support to create winning electoral coalitions;” (p.6). This result is
in line with Poterba (1994), who shows that political and institutional factors mat-
ter for adjustments to ﬁscal shocks. A State with a governor of one party and a
congress with opposing political party majority is slower to react to shocks. Poterba
further shows that U.S. States react to unexpected expenditure and revenue shocks
already within the ﬁscal year.5 The First National Bank of Boston (1981) points
out that, while socio-economic indicators cause ﬁscal conditions, they are not the
main cause for ﬁscal distress. Fiscal distress is not inevitable but within the ”grasp
of management control of most cities”. Their analysis thus supports the view that
structural factors are important for ﬁscal performance, but it also highlights the
role of political and management factors for crises. Honadle (2003) summarizes
the answers of state government oﬃcials on the causes of ﬁscal crises. Similarly,
oﬃcials mention structural (economic, demographic and institutional) factors, and
non-structural factors (management and politics) as reasons. However, the relative
importance of these factors is not assessed. The survey of the literature thus shows
that there is little systematic evidence on the main determinants of ﬁscal crises in a
large sample of U.S. cities.
The present paper contributes to the literature by presenting a coherent theo-
retical framework for the determinants of public spending and debt in cities and
testing it with a recent, large data set of U.S. cities. We show that a large percent-
age of cross-city variation in spending and debt can be explained by this model. In
addition the estimation results present systematic evidence on the importance of
structural factors and non-structural factors as determinants of crises. An analysis
of the identiﬁed distressed cities shows that extreme ﬁscal outcomes of distress can
not be explained by this common pool model based on measurable socio-economic
factors. It is therefore argued, that extreme ﬁscal outcomes are the result of non-
structural factors such as mismanagement, union-power in public administrations
and weak mayors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the common pool model and develops the empirical strategy. We then discuss the
available data. Section 4 presents the estimation results for the determinants of
4Cohen (1989) points out that municipal defaults are strongly correlated with the business
cycle. While it is true that ﬁscal distress becomes most obvious in recession years such as 1975,
the question remains unanswered why some cities then do have such problems and others do not.
5Ex-post budget data therefore only report part of the true crisis.5
public spending and debt. Section 5 discusses the cluster of ﬁscally distressed cities
and compares them with the non-distressed cities. The last section concludes.
2 Framework: the common pool resource prob-
lem
Consider a city with several population groups, which diﬀer in their preferences for
local public goods. The members of each group mainly beneﬁt from the speciﬁc good
provided for them. The goods are ﬁnanced by the general budget of the city, which
is a common pool. An example are swimming pools which are typically ﬁnanced
out of the common budget, while their beneﬁts accrue exclusively to those who
go swimming. Similarly, social services for the poor beneﬁt a restricted group of
people, while the related costs are paid out of the common budget. The common
pool resource literature shows that these constellations lead to an ineﬃcient over-
provision of the public good, if individual groups manage to inﬂuence the government
in their interest. The intuition for this result is the following. The cost of each
municipal good is spread to all tax-payers, while the beneﬁt accrues to the individual
only. Thus the individual will demand more of the municipal good, since the beneﬁt
from the good in the view of the beneﬁciary is larger than it is for the general
public.6
In the following we present a model of municipal demand for public goods, in
which there is no heterogeneity of preferences. Then, we introduce heterogeneity and
calculate the resulting allocation when a benevolent planner maximizes joint utility
given a joint resource constraint. It is shown that preference heterogeneity will lead
to higher demand for municipal goods if these goods are public goods. A public good
is deﬁned as a good with limited rivalry in consumption. The normative benchmark
of a benevolent planner maximizing the joint utility of all individuals living in the
city is compared with the allocation resulting from individual maximization of each
interest group. In this case, the common pool problem arises and leads to higher
spending and higher debt levels than optimal. In section 2.3 we derive our estimation
equation from the model.
Our model is based on a two-period economy with a municipal and a private
6This intuition follows the model by von Hagen and Harden (1994, 1995).6





of the municipal good g, where n is population size and g is the total amount of the
municipal good provided. Thus g∗
i characterizes the actual quantity received by an
individual consumer. If γ = 0, the municipal facility is a pure Samuelson (1954)-type
public good, there is no rivalry in consumption. 10 people can consume as much as
100 people of the good. If 0 < γ ≤ 1, there is a limited degree of rivalry in the use
of the good, γ > 1 indicates considerable crowding out in the use of the good. In
the latter case a city with a larger population needs to provide over-proportionally
of the municipal good in order for the individual consumer to enjoy the same level
of municipal good consumption as she would in a small city.
The utility of an individual i is given by





where ci denotes private consumption and the subscript period 1 and 2 respectively.
H is a usual strictly concave utility function for the municipal good. Further it is
assumed that ﬁrst period municipal consumption is ﬁnanced by issuing debt b =
P
bi. Furthermore the public sector cannot default.8 The city raises a tax rate τ on
second period income in order to repay the debt and to cover second period public
consumption. Every individual pays a fraction 0 < ζi < 1 of the public good, which
has a relative price q. Given that r is the interest rate the budget constraint of
individual i can be speciﬁed as follows:
ci,1 = yi,1 − bi (3)
ci,2 = (1 − τ)yi,2 + (1 + r)bi (4)
where yi,t denotes the income of person i in period t. Thus, ﬁrst period income of
an individual is used to consume and to buy city debt, in the second period, private
consumption equals the sum of after tax income and the repaid debt.
7It is similar to the model by Persson and Tabellini (2000, pp.345). A model with inﬁnite
periods is presented in Velasco (2000), the main insights, however, remain the same. In the
present paper the model by Persson and Tabellini is augmented in such a way, that we can derive
demand functions for municipal goods, as done in Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and similarly
in Borcherding and Deacon (1972).
8The last assumption is not as strict as it might appear as pointed out by Inman (2001). In
fact, the number of American cities going bankrupt in recent years was very limited. In the last
years, the main defaults were incurred by NYC, Camden, Philadelphia, Bridgeport, Miami and
Orange County and Washington D.C. (p.60). Of these cities, only Camden and Washington D.C.
received bail-outs.7
The tax income received from the individual i is thus equivalent to the share of
the municipal good in period 1 and period 2 paid by individual i:
τyi,2 = q1ζig1 + q2ζig2 (5)
and we assume that ﬁrst period bonds bought by individual i correspond to her paid
share of the municipal good in period 1.
bi = q1ζig1 (6)
The consolidated budget constraint is, assuming for simplicity an interest rate of
zero (r = 0) and no discounting, then given by:







The maximization problem for the optimal level of ci,2, g∗
i,1, and g∗
i,2 can then be
expressed as











2.1 A benchmark: the benevolent planner’s allocation
2.1.1 One municipal good
Suppose that all individuals i = 1...n have the same preferences. The benevolent
planner maximizes welfare deﬁned as the sum of all the individual utilities. Thus,
as a normative benchmark, we calculate the utilitarian optimum, which is obtained
by maximizing the Benthamite welfare function, subject to the resource constraint.










i,2) = 0 (10)
−nU1(ci,1,ci,2) + nU2(ci,1,ci,2) = 0 (11)
where Ut is the ﬁrst derivative of U with respect to ci,t at time t = 1,2 and H0 is the
ﬁrst derivative of H with respect to its argument. If the price of the public good is
constant over time q1 = q2, then optimal municipal consumption of individual i is
ﬂat over time g∗
i,1 = g∗
i,2, and given constant population size, g1 = g2. This directly
results from the strict concavity of the utility function. Private consumption will
also be equal in both periods. This benchmark thus characterizes the case of a
homogenous population, that has a common preference for one public good, such as
a public swimming pool.8
2.1.2 Two municipal goods
Now assume that the population is split into two groups j = A,B with diﬀerences in
their preferences regarding the public good. Group j prefers public good gj, where
j = A,B and γA = γB = γ. Thus, one group would like to have only a swimming
pool, while the other group derives utility only from public parks. The two groups



































































































i,2 ) = 0 (17)
and
−nU1(ci,1,ci,2) + nU2(ci,1,ci,2) = 0 (18)
Proposition 1. The benevolent planner equalizes public good provision across time
and across goods.
Proof: This follows from Equations 14-17, as the levels of g
j∗
i,t have to be equal





2.1.3 One municipal good vs. two municipal goods
In addition we can compare the amount of public good provided if there is only one
public good as opposed to two diﬀerent goods. Does heterogeneity in preferences
for diﬀerent goods increase total spending or decrease it? If we compare the ﬁrst
order condition of Equation 14 with the ﬁrst order conditions of Equation 9 (the










If γ < 1 then the term above is larger than 1, and therefore gA∗
i,1 < g∗
i,1. The
intuition to this result is quite simple. If the good provided by the city has some
public good character in the sense that there is limited rivalry in consumption, then
the city which only provides one good has a size advantage. Since n instead of
n/2 individuals pay for the municipal good, the enjoyed level of the public good
by an individual is larger. If however there is considerable crowding out, γ > 1,
then the smaller size of the group beneﬁtting from good A contributes to a higher
level of received good. This means on the other hand, that comparing the absolute
quantities provided, that if γ < 1, gA
1 + gB
1 = g1 > gnh
1 , where gnh
1 is the level of
municipal good provided if there is no heterogeneity (nh) of preferences. Thus, if
the consumption of the municipal goods is non-rival, an increase in the diversity
of preferences will increase the total amount of spending for municipal goods. For
example, if everybody living in a city has a strong preference for swimming pools,
and if swimming pools are of limited rivalry, then less has to be spent for the public
good than if one half of the population wants swimming pools and the other half only
wants public parks. Population heterogeneity thus requires higher public spending
if the public goods are non-rival (γ < 1). This result picks up the point made by
Oates (1988), who commented on the debate whether municipal goods are rival or
non-rival. The empirical studies performed with aggregate expenditure data usually
found that municipal goods are rival, thus quasi-private. Oates argued that this
measured eﬀect could just reﬂect that larger cities oﬀer a greater variety of goods,
which are each non-rival in nature.
2.2 Common pool resource problem, individual maximiza-
tion
After deriving the optimal allocation for the case of a benevolent planner who max-
imizes the sum of individual utilities, we now consider a society divided into two
interest groups, each of which maximizes their utility. Each of these groups derives
utility only from the municipal good provided speciﬁcally for them, taking as a bud-
get constraint the common pool of resources of both groups. It is assumed that the
results of the individual maximization, the actual individual demand functions will
actually be realized by the city government. Thus, we disregard the role institutions
might play to reduce the common pool problem. One could suppose that each group
has its own representatives in the city council and is thereby able to achieve its inter-
est. These representatives then try to get as many resources for their constituency
as possible.9 To ﬁgure out the solution to this problem, we start from the second
9Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997), von Hagen and Harden (1995) and von Hagen (1992) inves-








































i,2 ) = 0 (21)
Proposition 2. Public spending in the second period is higher, if each group indi-
vidually maximizes its utility, than if a benevolent planner maximizes joint utility.
Proof: In the common pool model with two goods and individual maximization,



















The proposition directly follows from the strict concavity of the H utility function.
Turning to ﬁrst period demand for municipal goods, we must account for the fact
that agents in their maximization problem know that second period consumption
depends on the consumption in the ﬁrst period. With the help of the implicit func-






1 ), where the ﬁrst derivative
of g
j∗0
2 with respect to ﬁrst period consumption is negative. Second period consump-
tion will be lower, the higher the inherited debt from the ﬁrst period. Higher debt
levels increase the marginal cost of second period spending, since a tax on income
needs to be raised to pay pack the debt and cover the spending of municipal goods
in the second period. In the ﬁrst period, the individuals take into account that
second period public consumption is inﬂuenced by ﬁrst period consumption. The




























































that budget institutions are a way to reduce this problem.11










i,2 ) = 0 (26)
Comparing this optimality condition with the one of the benevolent planner shows
that public consumption in the ﬁrst period is higher. As this public consumption is
ﬁnanced by issuing debt, also the debt level will be higher. Since the ﬁrst derivative
of second period consumption, gA∗0
i,2 , is negative, the term in brackets is larger 1.

























First period public consumption is higher than in the case of the benevolent planner
for two reasons: First of all, in the case of individual maximization more funds
are spent than optimally because individuals maximizers only have to pay half of
the additional costs. The second eﬀect stems from the fact that second period
consumption is negatively inﬂuenced by ﬁrst period consumption. As both groups
decrease their municipal spending demands for inherited debt of the ﬁrst period,
the cost of ﬁrst period municipal consumption appears lower since all individuals
share the cost in the second period. Both groups reduce future spending because of
current debt accumulation. From the point of view of group A, the cost of borrowing
is reduced since group B also reduces spending in the second period. Comparing
this result with the resulting level of municipal good in the second period, it can
be seen that ﬁrst period consumption of municipal goods is higher than second
period consumption. Thus, the common pool problem not only increases municipal





and therefore g1 > g2, because of the intertemporal common pool problem. Velasco
(2000) shows that this result also holds in a model with inﬁnite horizon. Debt is
accumulated up to the level at which the present discounted value of all available
future taxes equals the debt level. Thus, the common pool problem leads to a higher
accumulation of public debt than socially desirable.
The introduction of a common pool resource problem increases spending and
debt accumulation. Decentralized spending in a common pool of tax revenues entails
that more is spent than optimal. The same common pool factors, leading to higher
spending will also increase the accumulation of debt.12
2.3 Estimation strategy
To derive an equation, which we can estimate, we have to make some assumptions
concerning the utility function V . For ease of exposition we chose the function





Maximizing this function subject to the budget constraint (Equation 7), it follows
immediately, that c1 = c2 and g∗
1 = g∗
2. Let δ be the constant price elasticity and ²
the constant income elasticity and abstract from the common pool problem, using












δ · k. (30)
Taking logs, the following equation can be estimated:
ln(g) = c + αln(n) + ²ln(y) + δ ln(q1ζi) + βCP ... (31)
where
α = γ(1 + δ). (32)
from which the degree of crowding out γ can be calculated.10
Demand for municipal goods thus depends on the population size, income, the
price of the municipal good in terms of taxes and CP, which is a vector of variables
capturing the importance of the common pool problem. In addition, the common
pool resource model predicts that those factors that increase spending will also lead
to higher debt accumulation. Thus, we also regress the debt level on the common
pool factors.
ln(debt) = c + αln(n) + ²ln(y) + δ ln(q1ζi) + βCP ... (33)
However, we do not assume that income and the tax rate should determine the debt
level, since they do not constitute factors of the common pool problem. Diﬀerences
across cities in the debt level should be explained by the scale variable population
size and the degree of common pool problem, CP.
10Oates (1988) argues that the estimated coeﬃcient of 1 (the quasi-private nature of public
goods) can be the result of the so-called ”zoo-eﬀect”. Larger communities oﬀer a greater variety
of goods and services. Therefore, there is no congestion but rather a greater range of services.
However, most expenditure categories, like social services, policing, ﬁre, sewerage, and highways
do not appear to be subject to Oates’ point.13
In the following we will brieﬂy discuss the variables q1ζi,n,y and ways to oper-
ationalize the common pool problem CP.
q1ζi represents the share of the municipal good paid by individual i. It corre-
sponds to the taxes paid by the individual. The median house value is the tax
base, on which the most important municipal tax, the property tax, is levied.11 The
property tax represents a substantial part of municipal revenues (48.1% in 1984/85
of municipal tax revenues and 20.8 % of total municipal revenues in the whole of
the sample of cities), increases in the demand for municipal spending therefore will
probably lead to higher taxes on property. The median house value might be an
endogenous variable, since increased spending might positively aﬀect the median
house value through better security, nicer parks etc. Since appropriate instruments
for IV regressions are not available, we performed robustness checks by dropping the
median house value. All the other coeﬃcients stay stable. In addition, one can cal-
culate the direction of the bias and show that given some assumptions, the reported
coeﬃcient on the median house value is an upper bound of the true price elasticity
of demand.12 If the house value of the decisive voter increases, his demand for public
goods falls because he will have to pay a higher tax for this good. In addition to
the median house value we control for the percentage of people living in their own
houses. We suppose that people renting an apartment will expect that changes in
the property tax will not be immediately reﬂected in the rent paid. Thus a higher
percentage of people living in their own houses (a lower percentage of people renting
a ﬂat) will lead to lower demand for municipal services.
The income y is measured as mean income per capita. Higher income moves the
budget constraint and should in general result in higher demand. Population size n
increases the demand for public goods and public debt. It can also be a measure for
11Ideally one would want to have the property tax payment, however it is very diﬃcult to get data
on tax rates and the tax base. In the state of California, for example, there are two property tax
rates, an ad valorem rate and a yearly rate. Furthermore the rates diﬀer across counties. In addition
for most real property, the tax base is the adjusted base year value or the propertys current market
value, whichever is lower. Since property taxes are usually linear taxes, the estimated coeﬃcient
should be a linear transformation of the coeﬃcient we would get if we took the property tax as a
regressor. See also: http://www.boe.ca.gov/proptaxes/faqs/generalinfo.htm
12Suppose that E = βMH + ²1 and MH = γE + ²2. ²1,2 are uncorrelated error terms with
the usual properties. Under these assumptions the bias is given by E(b) = β +
cov(x,²1)
















. The bias is positive, if the nominator is positive. The nominator is positive
if (1 − βγ) > 0. Suppose that the true price elasticity is negative, while the inﬂuence of spending
on the median house value is unambiguously positive (for example Barrow and Rouse (2002) ﬁnd
that additional school spending leads to increased property values.), so β < 0 and γ > 0, then the
bias is positive. If the bias is positive, the estimated coeﬃcient represents an upper bound. Thus
the price elasticity is b or lower.14
the common pool problem since larger cities possibly have a larger set of interest
groups with diverse preferences.13 Intergovernmental general city revenue per capita
(grantpc) will increase the available pool. Therefore consumption of public goods
will increase since it will be costless for all interest groups accessing this pool.
As we have shown in subsection 2.2, the introducing of the common pool model
(CP) increases spending and debt. If more interest groups with diverse preferences
try to access the common pool of tax resources, the resulting demand will be higher.
In order to operationalize the degree of the common pool problem, we include social
and demographic variables (Ladd and Yinger 1989).
Higher employment per capita will increase the demand for roads, public trans-
port, policing, etc., because higher employment will generate more driving and other
activity.14
The percentage of Hispanics15 is added as an independent variable in our re-
gression, since Hispanics represent a speciﬁc interest group. Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly (1999) develop a model to show that the level of spending on municipal
goods is lower, the larger the median distance of preferences from the median voter’s
preferences. The more diverse preferences, the less likely voters will be satisﬁed with
the actual provision of public goods. Thus, voters will prefer private consumption
and thus a lower level of public spending. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) ﬁnd
that more ethnically diverse cities (representing diversity of preferences) have sig-
niﬁcantly lower share of spending on public goods. Their empirical result, however,
has to be interpreted with caution. As pointed out in their paper, more ethnically
diverse cities receive more intergovernmental grants. These grants are very often
13Beyond this eﬀect, larger populations will increase the demand for debt, as larger cities have a
higher creditworthiness, because they are ”too big to fail”.The ﬁscal crisis in NYC has shown, that
it is just impossible to leave a city like NYC completely alone. The federal government provided
a credit of $2.3 billion in short term loans at 1 percent above the treasury rate of 6 percent as
compared to the borrowing rate of the city at the time of 13.2 percent. Nevertheless bondholders
incurred signiﬁcant losses (Morris 1980, p.234). Therefore, their interest rates for bonds should be
lower, making deﬁcit-ﬁnancing cheaper. However, the evidence on the interest rate eﬀect is rather
weak. Asefa, Adams, and Starleaf (1981) argue that the variance of interest rates is too low to
explain diﬀerences in deﬁcits.
14There might be an endogeneity problem. Higher public spending might also positively aﬀect
employment. To account for this problem we performed separate regressions without this variable.
In addition we believe that current employment does not depend on current expenditure for high-
ways but rather on past expenditure for highways, since only ﬁnished highways are productive and
generate employment.
15We measure the variables hispanic, seniors, birth, crime, poverty, ownerhouse and public em-
ployment in percent as data between 0 < x < 1. Thus a 1 percentage point increase of Hispanics
in a city will have the impact of decreasing spending by β ∗ 0.01 ∗ 100% percent. The coeﬃcient
can thus be interpreted as semi-elasticities.15
tied to speciﬁc programs like social assistance and thereby necessarily reduce the
share of spending on public goods like roads. In addition, many public goods like
spending on roads can be targeted by the median decision maker to beneﬁt ar-
eas dominated by the median. A diﬀerent interpretation appears to be plausible.
Ethnic minorities, that do not participate in the political decision process, do not
receive any beneﬁts. However they do pay taxes. Therefore the disposable funds for
the majority increase. Given usual assumptions on the income elasticity and cross
elasticity of private and public goods, we expect part of the funds to be used for
public goods and part of it to reduce taxes. Thus, we would expect cities with a
larger ”minority” of non-voters to spend less per capita. Therefore, we control for
the percentage of Hispanics, since the voting participation rates of Hispanics diﬀers
substantially from those of Whites and African Americans. We suppose that the
diﬀerence in voting behavior should be reﬂected in the spending of the city govern-
ment, with cities spending less if they have many Hispanics. At the presidential
elections in 1988, 59.1 and 51.5 percent of the eligible white and black voters voted,
whereas only 28.8 of the eligible Hispanic voters did so (U.S. Census Bureau 1989).16
Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee (2000) show that in the 1996 presidential election the
Latino turnout was much lower than the aggregate turnout. Miranda and Walzer
(1994) ﬁnd that the percentage of African American signiﬁcantly increases spending
in the 1970s, it is however of no signiﬁcance in the 1980s. This might reﬂect the
fact that during the 1970s the black ”sector” (Clark and Ferguson 1983) had been
more active. The percentage of blacks is also insigniﬁcant in our regressions reﬂect-
ing missing diﬀerences in voting participation, while the percentage of Hispanics is
signiﬁcant.
Furthermore we include variables on demographic characteristics. The percent-
age of seniors living in a community will inﬂuence spending and debt. Seniors are
quite active in demanding speciﬁc services for themselves. Therefore we will expect
higher spending in a city with more seniors. On the other hand, seniors are less
likely to leave the city and will therefore probably prefer lower debt levels. Voters
and taxpayers are mobile and have the option to escape cities with high debt. In-
man (1982) argues that mobility of workers plays indeed a role.17 We can therefore
16In 1994, the current population survey gives the following: whites 47.3, black 37.1, hispanic
20.2 (http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/proﬁle/ptable1.txt) 1998: 46.5, 40, 20.
17He analyzes the funding decisions for public employee pensions in the framework of two models.
In one model, taxpayers are immobile and try to shift tax burden on the future by under-funding
pensions. Given the assumptions of perfect information Inman shows that implausible parameter
values would be necessary for this model. His favored model, on the other hand, depends on the
assumption of mobility. Taxpayers have an incentive to under-fund public pensions in order to
save taxes. The debt burden will be paid back by inhabitants of the city later, when the taxpayer
who beneﬁted from the under-funding, moves. The only market mechanism which would prevent16
suppose that cities with a younger population are more likely to have higher debt
levels, since young people are more likely to leave the city, or alternatively the more
old people live in a city, the less likely they are to leave, the lower the debt level.
The birth rate per capita will positively aﬀect the demand for municipal goods
and services like kindergarten and thereby increase overall spending. Also debt
levels will increase with the birth rates, reﬂecting voiced demand by young families.
Poverty will increase the demand for service programs for poor people. Similarly, the
debt level will increase with the poor trying to access the common pool.18 Higher
crime rates will increase the price for the provision of public security and thereby
increase demand for policing.19
A city with high population growth will have to spend a lot on infrastructure.
This spending is an investment, from which the whole population in the future will
beneﬁt. Thus, fast growing cities rationally ﬁnance these additional expenditures
through debt issuing. We would therefore expect that voters will favor higher debt,
since they want the immigrants to the city to participate in the ﬁnancing of munic-
ipal spending. Public employment will increase debt levels and spending. The more
public employees, the stronger are public employee unions, which represent a very
strong interest group with very speciﬁc preferences. Unions will successfully negoti-
ate for higher salaries and other beneﬁts for their members. In addition we include
a dummy for those cities that are involved in providing school services. Obviously,
we expect those cities that provide schooling to have a substantially larger budget.
An additional dummy is used for those cities providing health services from their
this from happening are functioning house markets, in which the current debt level of a city is
incorporated in the price of the house. However there are no studies showing that house markets
are eﬃcient.
18Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) propose a diﬀerent model of intergenerational redistribution.
In their model the poor would like to leave a negative bequest, while the rich leave a positive
bequest, and thus for the rich Ricardian equivalence holds. It is not possible to leave a negative
enforceable debt, therefore the poor will vote for a public debt in order to borrow from future
generations. Thus, in a voting model, one group is indiﬀerent while the other favors debt, thereby
leading to debt accumulation. The debt level is thus expected to positively correlate with poverty
in a city.
19There is a body of literature investigating whether crime rates and policing are linked. It is
diﬃcult to estimate whether higher police spending reduces crime rates, since police spending also
depends on crime rates. To solve the endogeneity problem, Levitt (1997) proposed to instrument
police spending by electoral cycles in police spending. He ﬁnds that police substantially reduces
violent crime, however it has little eﬀect on property crime. McCrary (2002) however points to a
mistake in Levitt’s estimation procedure. A corrected estimation shows that it is impossible with
this data set to learn about the causal eﬀect of police on crime. We are aware of the problem of
endogeneity, therefore we performed the same regressions without including the crime rate, the
other results stay the same.17
budget.
States have created tax and expenditure limits (TEL) (Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations and Center for Urban Policy and The Environment,
Indiana University 1995). TELs have gained some popularity in the late 1970s and
1980s. Their purpose is to limit the size of governments. However, their eﬀectiveness
is frequently questioned. Joyce and Mullins (1991) study the eﬀects of TELs on bud-
get outcomes. They point out that TELs have limited eﬀects on aggregate spending
and tax burdens. Knight and Levinson (2000) discuss the diﬃculties in estimating
the eﬀect of TELs, most notably the endogeneity problem. After accounting for
this problem, the evidence on the eﬀects of TELs is mixed. TELs lead to increased
dependence on state aid and on fees and worsened ﬁscal conditions for larger cities.
von Hagen (1991) ﬁnds little evidence for the eﬀectiveness of formal ﬁscal restraints
in reducing the likelihood of extreme outcomes in ﬁscal performance in US states.20
Our empirical results do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of TELs on city spending.
States have also tried to limit debt accumulation of cities. Some states have imposed
debt limits. In addition, the separation of a current account budget and a capital
account budget is supposed to ensure that the deﬁcit does not exceed the investment
of a city.21 Sbragia (1996) discusses in depth, how cities have tried to avoid limits
on their ﬁscal freedom by creating public authorities or public special districts and
by creating new bonds (revenue bonds) not subject to the law. Chicoine and Walzer
(1985) point out the complex relationship among several diﬀerent layers of govern-
ment, like special districts and authorities which sometimes fulﬁll similar functions.
It is found that institutional limits on debt and taxes have lead to the creation of
additional governments. In 1982 more than 82,000 local governments existed in the
United States. Their study is restricted to the state of Illinois. Increased fragmen-
tation is found to be positively associated with the level of property taxation and
there is some evidence for increased spending as well. Overall the eﬀect of TELs
and debt limits appears to be unclear our regression analysis did not show any eﬀect
and we therefore do not report the results.
20von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) investigate the eﬀect of borrowing restrictions in the Euro-
pean Union, which are put down in the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure (EDP) of the Maastricht Treaty
and argue that it should increase the demand for funds from upper level governments. Intergov-
ernmental grants have increased substantially between 1960 and 1990 (Stotsky and Stunley 1997).
21The capital account budget is the budget for investment activities of a city. It is ﬁnanced by
issuing debt. The current account budget should be ﬁnanced exclusively by revenues and not by
deﬁcits. New York is the most famous city, which over a 10 year period preceding the ﬁscal crisis
in 1974/5, borrowed to ﬁnance current account deﬁcits and thus broke this rule (Gramlich 1976).18
3 Data
The data set is taken from the County and City data book (CCDB (U.S. Census
Bureau 1988, 1994, 2000) ) and includes data for 971 (CCDB 1988) incorporated
cities, boroughs, towns, and villages (short: cities) in the United States that had
25,000 or more inhabitants in April 1980, 1070 (CCDB 1994, 2000) cities with more
than 25,000 inhabitants as of April 1, 1990.22 The data set consists of a compilation
of diﬀerent data, collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.23 It includes data on
the city budget (tax income, grants, expenditure, debt), the economic conditions of
the inhabitants (income, employment, unemployment, poverty, employment in dif-
ferent industries), and socio-demographic data (population, age, education, housing,
races and ethnic composition, birth rates, crime rates).
Since the data are taken from diﬀerent censuses, the dating of the variables is
not uniform. The precise dates are given in Table 1. The slightly diﬀering dating,
however, poses only minor problems, since the variables measured for example in
1980 instead of 1985 are highly autocorrelated in time. The percentage of, e.g.,
seniors in a city only slightly changes within 5 years. The correlation between the
number of seniors in a city in 1990 and 1980 is for the sample of 947 cities 0.91. The
cross sectional information therefore is rather stable.
The county and city data books for 1994 and 2000 do not report debt levels.
However, the County and City Extra book (1994, 2002) provides the debt level
and the percentage of expenditure on interest payments.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the most important variables in the data
set. The average municipality spent 584 US dollars per year per inhabitant in
1985, in 1997 this ﬁgure increased to 1040, representing an increase of 78 percent
in nominal terms and a real increase of 29 percent. The minimum spending in one
community increased from 107 dollars to 177, while the maximum increased from
2835 dollars to 5612, thus the spread increased. Of the 943 cities in our data set
in 1985 (1990, 1997), only 116 (113, 103) engage in education spending. All other
cities spend virtually nothing on education. In these cities, schooling services are
provided through special school districts, which raise their own taxes. The mean
expenditure per capita in cities providing school services is 1132$ (1801, 2313),
while it is only 507 (744, 933) dollars in cities having separate school districts for
the year 1985 (1991, 1997). In our regression analysis we control for this ”school”
2244 cities were meeting the criterion of 25,000 inhabitants in 1980 but not in 1990. On the
other hand, 143 cities had increased in population to be included in the later sample.
23Fuchs (1992) recommends the use of census data since they create a uniform classiﬁcation
scheme for the purpose of reliable comparative study between cities. Oﬃcial city budgets are not
recommended since they essentially represent ”political documents” (p.298).19
eﬀect by including a dummy for all cities spending more than 10 percent of their
budget on education.24 The mean (un-weighted) general revenues slightly exceed
the mean expenditures. Tax revenue represent less than 50 percent of the general
revenue. A signiﬁcant amount (around 25%, 24,7% and 29%) of the general revenue
is intergovernmental revenue.
Variation in general expenditure between cities stayed constant in the investi-
gated period (coeﬃcient of variation: 0.59, 0.59, 0.60) and is slightly smaller than
inter-city variation in tax revenue (0.66, 0.70, 0.64). This probably reﬂects the
equalizing role played by intergovernmental grants.
The average debt per capita is 850 (1197, 1490) dollars. Debt includes all long-
term debt obligations of the government and its agencies (exclusive of utility debt)
and all interest-bearing short-term (repayable within one year) debt obligations.
The data set does not diﬀerentiate between general obligation and revenue bonds.
The city with the largest debt burden (Farmington, NM)25 has more than 30,000
dollars debt per capita, the largest debt level dropped to 25,599 dollars in 1991
(Farmington, NM) and decreased further to 24,682 dollars in 1999 (Farmington,
NM). The average interest payments as a percent of general expenditure amount to
more than 7 percent in 1990/91 and more than 6 percent in 1999.
The average income per capita was 11,267 (14,799) dollars in 1985 (1989). For
the last cross section, no income data are presently available. The variation is sub-
stantial, ranging between 4,600 (Prichard, AL) and almost 34,000 dollars (Beverly
Hills, CA) in 1985. For the unweighed average, real income growth in the period
1979-1985 was slightly negative.26 However some cities gained more than 20 percent
real income, while others lost almost 20 percent. During 1985-1989, real income per
capita increased on average by 13 percent. The city size varies between 23,00027
and more than 7 million inhabitants. Population increased in the cities by 6 percent
from 1980 to 1986, in the second half of the 1980s it increased by 7.8 percent and
in the whole decade of the 1990s by 11.5 percent.28
On average, 43 percent of the inhabitants were employed in 1980 increasing to
around 47 percent in 1990.29 The average civilian labor force increased from 50
24If we take as a threshold 1 percent, the number of cities increases by less than 5.
25For the abbreviations see appendix, table 11.
26The USA was in a recession in 1981 and 1982.
27The data set includes cities with more than 25,000 inhabitants in 1980, the population data
are for the year 1986, therefore the city with 23 thousand.
28For an extensive study on urban population growth in the U.S., see Glaeser and Shapiro (2001).
29The data on employment are for persons 16 years old and over in the year 1980 and
refer to employment in the calendar last week of March 1980. People, who worked more20
to 53 percent. Unemployment varies considerably across cities ranging between 0
and 22 percent of the labor force, with a mean of 6.8 percent (6.6 in 1991; 4.1 in
2000). Employment in the manufacturing sector represents around 9 percent of the
population. Around 1 out of 100 inhabitants is employed by the city, the ﬁgure
raises in some cases to almost 8 out of 100.
In 1980, the percentage of Hispanics in the investigated cities varies greatly
between less than 1 percent and 93 percent. The mean percentage of Hispanics in the
population increased from 7.2 to almost 15 percent. Similarly there is considerable
cross city variation in the percentage of African Americans. 11.6 percent of the
average population was 65 years and older (seniors) in 1985 increasing only slightly
to 12.7, also with substantial variation across cities. Birth rates vary between 3 and
53 per 1000 inhabitants increasing from 16.9 (1984) to 18 (1988) new born per 1000
inhabitants. The average number of serious crimes per 100,000 inhabitants amounts
to almost 6000 in 1985, (1991:6375; 1999:5246).30 12 percent of the population are
poor in 1979 and 13 percent in 1989. Poverty is deﬁned by an absolute dollar income
threshold adapted to family size.31 On average 60 percent of the population live in
a house which they own, a ﬁgure changing only little over the years.
842 of the 943 cities used in our analysis are in a metropolitan statistical area
(MSA). The general concept underlying metropolitan areas is that of a core area
containing a large population nucleus together with adjacent communities having
a high degree of economic and social integration with that core. This data set
contains 33 MSAs, which have more than 3 cities, of which some are classiﬁed as
central and some are not central.32 In almost all 33 MSAs, the central city/cities
than 1 hour in that week, are considered employed. People are also asked for their place
of work, however the census data refer to the place of residence of people working. see
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf page 1017. This can introduce a problem, since
many people commute to diﬀerent places for work. However, usually people are taxed on the resi-
dence principle. We divided the total number of employed by the population size.
30Crime refers to murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft. Some cities report 0 crimes, a very unlikely outcome. We
therefore performed the same analysis, dropping the few cities reporting ”0” crime. The results do
not change.
31For details on the historical development of poverty thresholds, see:
http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/povmeas/papers/orshansky.html An important issue
is the revision of prices in calculating this threshold and the counting of non-cash bene-
ﬁts. For our analysis, however, these issues are of minor importance since we are interested
in a relative measure across states. It is important to know that this measure is not a
measure relative to an income distribution. Jared Bernstein discusses the short comings
of this poverty measure in a recent article in the New York Times, September 26, 2003
(http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/26/opinion/26BERN.html?th).
32In some cases, the data set only has the nucleus city, since the surrounding cities are all smaller21
spend considerably more and also have a higher debt burden per capita.
25,000.22
mid 1980s Unit year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
expenditure $ per capita 1984/85 943 584.52 347.61 107.0 2835.0
general revenue $ per capita 1984/85 943 607.50 372.45 59.9 4012.8
tax revenue $ per capita 1984/85 943 253.69 167.69 0.0 1894.0
debt $ per capita 1984/85 943 853.98 1386.48 0.0 30594.1
interest on debt percent expenditure
intergovernmental grant $ per capita 1984/85 943 156.28 152.55 0.0 1274.2
income $ per capita 1985 943 11266.87 3022.87 4674.0 33839.0
population persons 1986 943 102288.30 304806.20 23070.0 7262750.0
income growth real 1979-85 943 -0.01 0.07 -0.2 0.2
population growth 1980-86 943 6.09 12.59 -13.2 129.9
employment per capita 1980 943 0.43 0.07 0.2 0.6
civilian employment per capita NA
civilian labor force per capita 1986 943 0.50 0.09 0.0 0.7
unemployment percent 1986 943 6.84 3.17 0.0 22.5
manufacturing employment per capita 1982 943 9.26 9.48 0.0 85.3
manufacturing employment growth 1977-82 943 8.41 41.32 -71.0 300.0
public employment per 10000 1985 943 130.96 92.90 0.0 797.1
hispanic percent 1980 943 7.21 12.29 0.3 93.0
seniors percent 1980 943 11.57 5.29 1.7 51.8
birth per 1000 1984 943 16.87 5.16 2.8 53.9
crime per 100000 1985 943 5946.98 3212.61 0.0 38379.0
poverty percent 1979 943 11.92 6.76 1.4 43.3
own house percent 1980 943 59.57 13.30 13.4 92.6
early 1990s
expenditure $ per capita 1990/91 1009 862.97 514.40 161.0 4587.0
general revenue $ per capita 1990/91 1009 826.04 500.90 156.1 4694.9
tax revenue $ per capita 1990/91 1009 358.55 250.14 36.8 2363.0
debt $ per capita 1990/91 1003 1197.07 1607.08 0.0 25599.4
interest on debt percent expenditure 1990/91 1003 7.51 7.83 0.00 77.70
intergovernmental grant $ per capita 1990/91 1009 201.36 232.52 1.1 1838.9
income $ per capita 1989 1009 14779.75 4897.91 5561.0 55463.0
population persons 1990 1009 101139.50 296020.50 20716.0 7311966.0
income growth real 1985-89 866 0.13 0.11 -0.2 0.9
population growth 1986-92 866 7.81 15.77 -22.3 117.4
employment per capita NA
civilian employment per capita 1990 1009 0.46 0.06 0.2 0.6
civilian labor force per capita 1991 1009 0.49 0.06 0.2 0.7
unemployment percent 1991 1009 6.59 2.94 0.0 17.9
manufacturing employment per capita 1987 1009 8.20 8.91 0.0 68.5
manufacturing employment growth 1982-87 666 7.57 44.5 -69.6 446.1538
public employment per 10000 1991 1008 122.72 88.20 0.0 869.0
hispanic percent 1990 1009 10.49 15.31 0.2 93.9
seniors percent 1990 1009 12.57 5.13 2.0 48.5
birth per 1000 1988 988 18.03 5.76 1.1 49.5
crime per 100000 1991 1009 6375.52 3776.27 0.0 37903.0
poverty percent 1989 1009 13.35 8.04 1.1 46.1
own house percent 1990 1009 58.00 12.60 21.6 91.5
late 1990s
expenditure $ per capita 1996/97 983 1040.88 631.00 177.0 5612.0
general revenue $ per capita 1996/97 984 1019.61 609.67 202.5 5463.87
tax revenue $ per capita 1996/97 984 440.0855 282.45 53.7 2418.52
debt $ per capita 1999 889 1489.99 1485.88 0.0 24682.9
interest on debt percent expenditure 1999 888 6.05 5.28 0.0 50.8
intergovernmental grant $ per capita 1999 882 318.64 383.65 0.0 2929.0
income $ per capita NA
income manufacturing $ per employee 1997 857 33874.53 8019.27 15229.6 93565.1
population persons 2000 1057 107379.10 314612.60 20681.0 8008278.0
income growth real NA
population growth 1990-2000 1056 11.54 19.51 -24.6 265.6
employment per capita NA
civilian employment per capita NA
civilian labor force per capita 2000 1055 0.53 0.39 0.2 11.6
unemployment percent 2000 1055 4.09 2.38 0.9 25.5
manufacturing employment per capita 1997 874 8.10 7.65 0.0 95.0
manufacturing employment growth 1987-97 756 1.61 81.29 -100.3 1102.1
public employment per 10000 NA
hispanic percent 2000 1057 14.92 18.13 0.5 96.3
seniors percent 2000 1057 12.69 6.27 3.2 130.8
birth per 1000 NA
crime per 100000 1999 887 5246.80 2582.60 105.8 22322
own house percent 2000 1057 59.21 13.16 10.9 92.7




Table 2 presents estimation results of equation 31. For reasons of comparison we
limited the sample to those cities for which we had observations in all three years.
Regression results only slightly change if all available cities are included as obser-
vations (Appendix Tables 12+13). More than 90 percent of the variance can be
explained by the independent variables.33 Municipal spending is thus largely de-
termined by price, income, population size and additional demographic and control
variables reﬂecting common pool problems. The income elasticity of demand is 0.9,
the price elasticity is negative, however not always signiﬁcant. Remarkable is the
coeﬃcient for the population size. It is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1 in those re-
gression, that do not include the tax base. This indicates that to obtain the same
level of service, larger cities need to spend over-proportionally more. There are thus
diseconomies of scale to the production or consumption of local municipal goods.
This result is conﬁrmed, if we compute the coeﬃcient γ of crowding out according
to Equation (32). In all regressions it is larger than 1.34 Thus, the advantages
of sharing costs are overcompensated by increased costs of either production or the
sharing of these goods. There are no economies of scale to larger municipalities. The
ﬁrst two regressions present the results for all variables available in 1985 and 1991.
Spending reacts to employment. Cities with 1 percentage point more employment
per capita spend around 0.85 percent more. Poverty and birth rates are also factors
increasing spending as predicted by the common pool model.
Coeﬃcients of the variables are relatively stable over time. We tested formally for
equivalence of coeﬃcient and had to reject the H0 that the diﬀerence of coeﬃcients
is zero. The Chow (1960) test on all variables except intergovernmental grants,
however, did not allow to reject the hypothesis of constant coeﬃcients in time. We
therefore present results of pooled regressions allowing for ﬂexibility of the coeﬃcient
intergovernmental grant in time (last column).
House ownership signiﬁcantly reduces spending of cities. Cities taking care of
33To account for possible heteroscedasticity problems, we performed robust estimation (White
1980). The results did not change. We also controlled for those cities performing county functions,
since they do not have an overlying county government. However, the coeﬃcient for this dummy
is insigniﬁcant and therefore we do not report this result.
34We do not present the speciﬁc values because the coeﬃcient of median house value is not equal
to the theoretical δ. To receive the correct coeﬃcient one would have to multiply the reported
coeﬃcient with the applicable tax rate. This would considerably reduce the absolute size of the
coeﬃcient, however γ will remain larger than 1, since the price elasticity is always negative.24
schools (education) on average spend 28 percent more than those that do not. Health
spending is a strong factor of city spending. Cities engaged in the provision of health
services, spend 50 percent more than cities which do not. Each additional 100 dol-
lars per capita intergovernmental grants will signiﬁcantly increase spending by 0.07
percent, the eﬀect of intergovernmental transfers on spending is thus negligibly low,
they are apparently used to reduce tax burdens. The diﬀerence in voting participa-
tion of Hispanics is indeed reﬂected in lower spending the higher the percentage of
Hispanics. The percentage of seniors increases the demand for municipal spending.
Crime rates signiﬁcantly increases the spending of municipalities. Central cities also
have higher spending needs, since probably they have to provide a lot of infrastruc-
ture for neighboring communities.
The system of municipal organization in form of a council-manager (CM)35 sys-
tem or a mayor-council (MC)36 had no inﬂuence on spending. We therefore do not
report the regression results. However, the system of MC is more common in larger
cities, which also have higher spending per capita.
The high degree of explained variance can be taken as an indication of the low
importance of political factors like the degree of organization of municipal employees,
the ”ﬁscal liberalism” of the mayor or the party membership of the mayor, factors
not included in the regression. In fact, Miranda and Walzer (1994) ﬁnd that these
variables are insigniﬁcant in regressions explaining the level spending of common
functions and also the change in this spending for a limited set of cities.
35The council-manager form is similar in structure to a private corporation, with the voters,
council, and a manager being organizationally similar to the stockholders, board of directors, and
corporate general manger. There are few elective oﬃcers – usually only a council – with the
mayor generally selected by and from the council to serve as a titular and ceremonial leader and
to preside at council meetings. The policy-making legislative body is the council. The manager is
a full-time professional executive charged with the administration of municipal aﬀairs, appointed
by, responsible to, and subject to dismissal by the council. The manager’s tenure is based solely
on performance.
36The mayor-council form of government is characterized by a directly elected mayor, who in
many cases has the right to veto legislation. She/He is a strong political leader, who can be held
accountable for political decisions.25
1985 1991 1985 1991 1997 pooled
log(income per capita) 0.92 0.95
0.16 0.14
log(population) 1.00 1.03 1.04 1.07 1.07 1.06
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
log(median house value) -0.10 -0.16
0.09 0.08
own house 0.00 -0.18 -0.43 -0.43 -0.60 -0.49
0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.08
school 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.32 0.27 0.28
0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.07
health 0.44 0.56 0.41 0.56 0.57 0.50
0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.04
grant per capita 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.07
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
employment per capita 1.08 0.58
0.28 0.38
income growth -0.04 0.14
0.34 0.18
hispanic -0.31 -0.05 -0.78 -0.57 -0.64 -0.63
0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.06
seniors 0.84 0.72 1.22 1.17 0.67 0.91
0.34 0.37 0.32 0.34 0.26 0.17
birth 11.51 8.42
3.50 3.03
crime 2.16 1.75 2.99 2.05 3.17 2.37
0.66 0.51 0.65 0.54 0.75 0.33
poverty 1.98 1.78
0.45 0.36
central 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
t2*grant per capita -0.01
0.01






constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
state dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 606 606 606 606 606 1818
adj. R2 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.9 0.91 0.92
Table 2: Determinants of general municipal expenditure, comparison of the diﬀerent
years for the same set of cities and if possible the same set of regressors. Standard
errors are reported below the coeﬃcient.26
Table 3 reports the results for the estimation of the demand for speciﬁc municipal
goods. The income elasticities for the diﬀerent goods diﬀer substantially. The
point estimate for parks and recreation areas is larger than 1, indicating that they
are luxury goods.37 The crowding parameter γ (see Equation 32) is larger than 1
for the demand of police services and sewerage and sanitation services, there are
thus no economies of scale for these two goods. For parks and recreation areas
γ is 1. The price elasticities are negative, except for the luxury good, for which
the elasticity is statistically not diﬀerent from zero. Interestingly, the percentage
of people living in their own house has a negative impact on demand for police
services, but not on sewerage services. This probably reﬂects the fact, that usually
the fees for sewerage services are directly imposed on the tenant, increased taxes (e.g.
for police spending) however are not directly added to the rent. Cities engaged in
police sewerage highways parks
1985 1991 2000 1985 1991 2000 1985 1991 2000 1985
log(income per capita) 0.48 0.68 0.54 0.45 0.85 0.96 1.073
0.09 0.09 0.28 0.29 0.17 0.17 0.288
log(population) 1.03 1.06 1.15 0.86 0.87 1.01 0.82 0.84 0.90 1.084
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.037
log(median house value) -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.28 -0.41 0.085
0.06 0.06 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.158
own house -0.39 -0.47 -0.38 -0.33 -0.07 -1.26 -0.18 -0.37 0.29 -0.005
0.11 0.13 0.13 0.34 0.40 0.40 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.003
log(area) 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.19 0.17 0.11
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05
school -0.17 -0.20 -0.18 -0.41 -0.19 -0.05 -0.04 -0.20 0.12 -0.162
0.06 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.166
health -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.01 -0.33 -0.06 0.03 -0.05 -0.005
0.04 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.105
grant per capita 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.001
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.000
employment per capita 1.04 0.59 1.01 2.40 0.60 1.41 1.519
0.19 0.27 0.57 0.83 0.35 0.51 0.526
income growth -0.710
0.663
hispanic 0.20 0.14 -0.41 -0.77 -0.25 -0.89 -0.42 0.14 -0.69 0.000
0.10 0.10 0.09 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.003
seniors 0.93 0.96 0.92 1.16 2.62 1.48 -0.72 0.02 0.15 0.017
0.23 0.26 0.24 0.68 0.83 0.69 0.41 0.50 0.46 0.006
birth -0.47 4.74 6.25 12.35 6.63 2.34 0.098
2.34 2.21 6.89 6.83 4.21 4.16 0.063
crime 4.51 4.38 5.50 -0.28 0.89 2.56 1.55 2.13 1.67 0.002
0.40 0.36 0.67 1.16 1.09 1.95 0.72 0.67 1.31 0.001
poverty 0.47 0.86 1.93 2.13 0.72 0.41 0.013
0.28 0.24 0.83 0.75 0.51 0.46 0.008
central 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.20 0.25 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.201
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.058
constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 941 864 612 910 824 595 942 866 612 909
adj. R2 0.929 0.93 0.928 0.65 0.598 0.58 0.786 0.78 0.74 0.739
Table 3: Determinants of speciﬁc municipal expenditure, diﬀerent years. Standard
errors are reported below the coeﬃcient.
providing school services spend signiﬁcantly less on police. This can be interpreted as
evidence that in cities with broad responsibilities, the opportunity-costs of spending
for police vs. spending for schools are taken into account, see also Bradbury (1983a,
37However, the coeﬃcient is not statistically diﬀerent from 1.27
p.40). The result is valid if there are no eﬃciency diﬀerences in the provision of
schooling between city governments and school districts, since then given the same
expenditure for schooling less is spent on other services. Intergovernmental grants
increase spending for all four goods, though for highways it is only signiﬁcant at
a 10 percent level. Higher employment per capita increases police spending and
park spending, but has no eﬀect on sewerage spending. The percentage of Hispanics
has no impact on police and park demand, although it is associated with a lower
demand for sewerage services. Seniors want more police and more parks, but their
demand of sewerage services is not diﬀerent from the rest of the population. Birth
rates are insigniﬁcant. Crime and poverty rates have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on police
spending38, however, crime rates leave the demand for sewerage and parks unchanged
and poverty increases the demand for sewerage, but not for parks. Central cities
spend more for sewerage and parks, but the police spending is the same. The size
of the city in terms of square miles (area) matters for spending on sewerage and
highways, but is irrelevant for the police provision.
Central cities spend signiﬁcantly more on highways. In addition, the crowding
parameter γ is clearly and signiﬁcantly larger than 1 for highways, but not for police
and sewerage. The price-elasticity is signiﬁcantly negative, income elasticity is close
to 1. Schooling and health provision have no inﬂuence on the provision of highways,
nor do employment per capita and income growth in the last 5 years. Cities with
higher Hispanic population and with higher percentages of elderly spend less on
highways. Cities with greater poverty demand more highways.
To summarize the section on municipal spending: A great part of the overall
variation in spending can be explained by economic and socio-demographic factors.
There is a considerable degree of congestion in the use or provision of municipal
goods. Central cities spend around 10 percent more than cities outside of the center
(which in most cases belong to a Metropolitan area). Central cities thus appear to
provide goods and services for surrounding areas. However the demand equations do
not reveal, whether central cities can export taxes to the degree of their increased
cost. In the next section, we will see that central cities appear to ﬁnance their
increased spending burden partly through higher deﬁcit accumulation. Responsi-
38There is a body of literature investigating whether crime rates and policing are linked. It is
diﬃcult to estimate whether higher police spending reduces crime rates, since police spending also
depends on crime rates. To solve the endogeneity problem, Levitt (1997) proposed to instrument
police spending by electoral cycles in police spending. He ﬁnds that police substantially reduces
violent crime, however it has little eﬀect on property crime. McCrary (2002) however points to a
mistake in Levitt’s estimation procedure. A corrected estimation shows that it is impossible with
this data set to learn about the causal eﬀect of police on crime. We are aware of the problem of
endogeneity, therefore we performed the same regressions without including the crime rate, the
other results stay the same.28
bility of a city government for schooling implies that general spending increases by
around 28 percent. However, spending for speciﬁc purposes like police and sewerage
is reduced. Thus the opportunity costs of schooling are internalized in the decision
process and some other spending is cut in favor of the schools. Cautiously, we can
draw the conclusions, that consolidation of services in one hand will make the deci-
sion making process more transparent and improve the spending outcome, see also
Chicoine and Walzer (1985, pp.225-229.).
4.2 Municipal debt
There are only few articles on the determinants of municipal debt. Sharp (1986)
studies the politics and economics of new city debt. She diﬀerentiates between gen-
eral obligation as opposed to revenue bonds. The ﬁndings indicate that while general
obligation bonds and taxation are largely inﬂuenced by longer-term factors, such as
population, functional scope and regional location, the revenue bonds decision is a
strategic arena, in which city oﬃcials maneuver to adapt to immediate ﬁscal strain.
In our analysis we focus on total debt.39 Farnham (1988) estimates reduced form
regressions of a model of local debt choice and the impact of State regulatory ac-
tivity on the use of local government debt in a large cross section of 2000 American
cities. He ﬁnds that state imposed local debt limits signiﬁcantly reduce debt levels
of local governments.
We run OLS regressions of the log of debt on a number of independent variables
as given in Equation 33. Table 4 presents the determinants of debt in 629 U.S. cities
available with this set of regressors in all three years. The ﬁrst remarkable result of
our regression analysis is the high degree of explained variance. 63 percent of the
cross city variation in debt is explained by our model in all three years. The driving
factor behind debt is the population size. Larger cities have signiﬁcantly higher
debt. In addition, the coeﬃcient for the log of population is signiﬁcantly larger than
1 as it was for spending. Cities, that have experienced higher population growth
in the years before the cross section also have accumulated more debt. Income
per capita does not explain the observed debt levels. The median house value is
also insigniﬁcant in the regressions as can be seen in Table 14 in the appendix.
The coeﬃcient on population density is signiﬁcantly negative, thus more densely
populated cities have lower debt levels. McGuire and Sjoquist (2003) also stress that
39Woo (2003) reviews the literature on the determinants of national deﬁcits and presents some
new results. He ﬁnds that sociopolitical instability, income inequality, a large size of the cabinet and
lack of central authority determine deﬁcits. In addition, budgetary institutions and government
institutions matter for deﬁcits. Thereby he conﬁrms earlier results in the literature (von Hagen
1992).29
1985 1991 1999 pooled
log(population) 1.06 1.20 1.17 1.15
0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03
population growth 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
population density -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
own house -0.90 -0.37 0.04 -0.51
0.41 0.45 0.40 0.23
school -0.12 -0.26 0.05 -0.08
0.27 0.31 0.28 0.15
health 0.34 0.34 0.19 0.34
0.16 0.19 0.20 0.10
grant per capita 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.06
0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01
hispanic -0.47 -0.06 -0.20 -0.21
0.37 0.35 0.26 0.18
seniors -1.63 -1.92 -1.84 -1.63
0.93 1.06 1.09 0.56
crime 2.60 3.42 3.38 2.70
1.53 1.42 1.79 0.81
central 0.23 0.03 0.23 0.23









constant yes yes yes yes
state dummies yes yes yes yes
obs 629 629 629 1887
adj. R2 0.63 0.615 0.669 0.667
Table 4: Determinants of municipal debt for a constant set of cities. Standard errors
are reported below the coeﬃcient.
urban sprawl will increase the cost of municipal good provision. The percentage
of people living in their own house signiﬁcantly reduces accumulation of public
debt. Again it can be argued that house-owners know about the future cost of
debt. Increased intergovernmental grants increase the debt level. However, they
are probably an endogenous variable and therefore we performed the regressions
without them and found no considerable changes for the other variables. The higher
the percentage of seniors in a city, the lower will be the debt level of a city. This
probably reﬂects the fact that seniors are less likely to leave a city and thereby
escape the debt burden of the city, as young people might intend to do. Higher
crime rates are associated with higher debt levels.
Poverty signiﬁcantly explains debt levels (Table 14). Its signiﬁcance increases
after dropping the insigniﬁcant variable income. The higher debt levels can be the
result of the common pool problem since poor people might successfully lobby for30
additional spending and debt. Central cities all have clearly higher debt burdens in
1985 and 1999, the coeﬃcient is however not signiﬁcant in 1991. Cities with a larger
public labor force per capita also have chosen signiﬁcantly higher debt levels. A city
with 1 additional city employee per 100 inhabitants will have a 37 percent higher
debt burden in 1985, which dropped to 27 percent in 1991. The level of formal
education of the population has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the debt level.40
The estimated coeﬃcients look very stable in time. We performed Chow test for
stability of coeﬃcients and had to reject the H0 of equal coeﬃcients.41 However,
if we test for equality of coeﬃcients omitting the coeﬃcient of ”central”, the H0 of
coeﬃcient equality could not be rejected with an F(20,1805) = 1.15, giving a p-
value of 0.29. Therefore, we present the results for the balanced pooled regressions
allowing for diﬀerent coeﬃcients of the dummy central in 1992 and 1999.
In the pooled regression debt over-proportionally increases with population size,
the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1. More densely populated cities have a
comparatively lower debt level. If population density increases by 1000/square mile,
the debt level will decrease by 0.04 percent. An increase of 1 percentage point of
house owner will decrease the debt level by −0.5 percent. Cities providing health
services have higher debt levels. A city with 1 percentage point additional seniors
will have a -1.6 percent lower level of debt. Cities with higher crimes rates have
signiﬁcantly higher debt burdens. This captures in part the eﬀect of poverty, a
variable which we expected to be associated with higher debt levels. Central cities
have a 17 percent higher debt level. The debt levels increased in time by 27 and
56 percent as indicated by the time dummies. This captures exactly the change of
the price level, which was 26.6 and 54.8 percent in the period 1985-91 respectively
1985-99.
To summarize the section on determinants of municipal debt: We ﬁnd that a
large percentage of debt variation across cities is explained by our structural common
pool model. Central cities have signiﬁcantly higher debt burdens (around 23 percent
higher after controlling for population size). However, in 1991 central cities do not
have a diﬀerent debt level from the non-central cities. Apparently, some of their
higher spending as compared to the surrounding cities is not ﬁnanced through higher
taxes or tax exports, but by issuing debt. Cities with a higher percentage of seniors
have signiﬁcantly lower debt levels, house ownership also reduces debt levels. Crime
rates and poverty rates lead to higher debt levels.
40We do not report this regression result. Results are available from the author.
41This result holds in the case of constraining the residual variance to be the same each year
and in the case of not constraining the variance to be equal.31
5 Fiscal crises
5.1 Cluster analysis
The previous section has shown that economic and socio-demographic factors explain
almost the entire variance of municipal spending and a large percentage of the
variance of debt. This section is intended to identify cities in ﬁscal crises. We
then want to investigate whether these cities are in a crisis-situation because of the
identiﬁed economic, social and demographic factors, or whether the causes of crises
must be sought in non-structural factors. There is no data set available reporting
the occurrence of crises in American cities. Therefore we must employ indicators
of crises. In all reviewed case studies of municipal ﬁscal crises, a high debt level
was mentioned as a symptom of a ﬁscal crisis. High debt implies that the ﬁnancial
independence of a city is limited. Resources must be used to pay the interest, the
credit worthiness is reduced. Thus, cities with a high debt burden can only to a
limited extent react to ﬁnancial challenges.
Cluster analysis allows to partition observations in subgroups, which are very
homogenous within and heterogenous relative to the other groups. We cluster cities
in two groups according to the minimal distance to the group mean. The distance
is measured by Euclidian (Minkowski) distance, which is characterized by the root
of the sum of squared distances. The relevant variable of the budget for clustering
is a high accumulated debt burden per capita.42 Applying the described method
to our data set results in the cluster characterized in Tables 5 to 7. We limit our
analysis to the same set of cities for all three years, for which we were able to run
both regressions in the previous section, in total 592 cities.
The cluster of crises/distress cities is characterized by an average debt burden
10 times as high as the average debt burden in the rest of the cities in the sample, in
later years the ratio is still 4 to 1. 14 cities have a very high debt burden in 1985, in
1991 the cluster analysis calculates a lower threshold and the distressed cluster has
37 cities. Finally, in 1999 the threshold is even lower and 75 cities are clustered to
be high debt cities. Over the 15 years considered, the average debt level increased
with inﬂation. The distribution of debt levels stayed roughly constant in the sense
that the standard deviation did not change. However, the extreme cases of high
debt levels went down. Farmington, NM, reduced its nominal debt level from more
42We also performed the clustering with debt as percent of income. The resulting cluster is
almost the same. Another possible way to cluster the cities is to take the debt level per house per
median house value. The higher this ratio, the lower the possibility to raise funds to pay back the
debt. Using this variable as a cluster variable, however, gives very similar results (available from
the author).32
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
distressed cities
debt per capita 14 7472.4 6803.1 4090.8 30594.1
mean income 14 10646.4 1638.3 8574.0 14840.0
income growth 14 -0.01 0.05 -0.13 0.09
population growth 14 12.3 11.4 -3.8 30.6
population 14 104940.7 98420.3 39050.0 356840.0
expenditure per capita 14 1117.8 526.1 533.0 2452.0
police exp. per capita 14 83.4 24.2 53.1 143.1
highway exp. per capita 14 17.1 10.3 1.5 38.0
sewerage expenditure per capita 14 110.9 81.1 7.4 275.7
residuals spending 14 0.52 0.35 0.02 1.18
residuals debt 14 1.40 0.77 0.26 2.78
tax per capita 14 225.8 64.6 113.0 330.0
intergov’t grants per capita 14 140.8 92.7 78.2 407.7
non-distressed cities
debt per capita 578 830.9 643.7 10.8 3693.8
mean income 578 11189.4 2755.5 5275.0 33839.0
income growth 578 0.00 0.07 -0.18 0.22
population growth 578 7.7 12.8 -13.2 65.0
population 578 130483.4 380310.6 24180.0 7262750.0
expenditure per capita 578 625.7 339.7 152.0 2835.0
police exp. per capita 578 79.3 32.3 27.7 346.6
highway exp. per capita 578 15.8 11.5 -28.1 64.4
sewerage expenditure per capita 568 78.0 64.0 0.6 664.5
residuals spending 578 0.21 0.18 0.00 1.35
residuals debt 578 0.59 0.55 0.00 3.52
tax per capita 578 270.2 171.0 35.0 1464.0
intergov’t grants per capita 578 173.1 165.8 9.0 1274.2
Table 5: Summary statistics of cities in the crises and the non-crises cluster in 1985.
than 30,000 US$ to less than 25,000 US$ per capita. Public expenditure per capita
is twice as high at 1100 dollars and statistically signiﬁcant in 1985, and roughly 50
percent higher in the later years.
Income per capita is almost the same in the two clusters. Income growth in
the last 5 years was somewhat lower in 1985 but not in 1991, population growth
in the preceding 5 years was more than 11 percentage points higher in 1985 and
5.7 percentage points higher in 1991. The ten year population growth in the 1999
cluster does not diﬀer. Distressed cities also have larger population in 1991 and
1999, the diﬀerence is however not statistically signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, in 1991
the population size is three times as high and in 1999 almost four times as high. A
possible explanation might be, as indicated by Buettner and Wildasin (2003), soft
budget constraints for larger cities. Taxes raised by the city government per capita
are the same except for 1999, so are intergovernmental general revenue and federal
grant awards and procurement contract awards.
Although the structural factors seem to be diﬀerent in the crises cluster, the
diﬀerence is statistically not signiﬁcant. Are the debt levels respectively spending
decisions of the crises-cities well predicted by the regression model? A closer look
at the data shows, that all 14 cities in 1985 have a positive residual in the spending33
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
distressed cities
debtpc 37 5624.9 3783.2 3369.2 25599.4
debt per capita growth 37 6.4 29.5 -0.3 180.7
mean income 37 14613.4 3919.9 7238.0 24812.0
income growth 37 0.13 0.11 -0.06 0.44
population growth 37 13.6 26.9 -9.1 117.4
population 37 336049.8 1193024.0 31793.0 7311966.0
expenditure per capita 37 1368.1 861.7 599.0 4587.0
police exp. per capita 37 137.1 61.7 53.4 343.7
highway exp. per capita 37 21.9 13.5 0.9 70.3
sewerage expenditure per capita 34 147.2 102.4 11.5 460.2
residuals spending 37 0.35 0.31 0.00 1.38
residuals debt 37 1.30 0.81 0.03 2.89
tax per capita 37 449.4 388.7 107.0 2193.4
intergov’t grants per capita 37 219.0 328.1 36.0 1838.9
interest as percent of expenditure 37 21.5 13.4 2.2 55.6
non-distressed cities
debtpc 555 1038.7 716.4 3.6 3311.9
debt per capita growth 555 1.0 4.4 -1.0 76.7
mean income 555 14407.6 4462.7 6284.0 55463.0
income growth 555 0.13 0.11 -0.16 0.89
population growth 555 8.8 15.8 -18.9 107.8
population 555 122393.6 238713.2 24356.0 3489779.0
expenditure per capita 555 922.8 510.5 220.0 3751.0
police exp. per capita 555 116.8 49.8 31.4 611.6
highway exp. per capita 555 20.2 12.0 -20.7 78.0
sewerage expenditure per capita 536 110.3 76.2 0.3 604.9
residuals spending 555 0.20 0.17 0.00 1.20
residuals debt 555 0.57 0.59 0.00 5.06
tax per capita 555 385.9 244.6 36.8 1908.3
intergov’t grants per capita 555 232.1 264.9 1.5 1770.6
interest as percent of expenditure 555 6.9 6.1 0.0 77.7
Table 6: Summary statistics of cities in the crises and the non-crises cluster in 1991.
and in the debt regressions. Their absolute mean error is 1.4 as compared to the
mean absolute error of the remaining 578 cities of 0.59. The mean error is thus more
than twice as high as the average standard deviation of the error in the sample. If
we take as a threshold 2 ∗ Std.Dev. = 2 ∗ 0.56 = 1.12 of the absolute residual error,
10 of the 14 cities in the ”bad” cluster are outliers. This means, that in 70 percent
of the cases, the model can not explain the overly high debt burden well. In 1991,
the threshold is 2∗0.63 = 1.26 and even with a broader set of cities deﬁned to be in
distress, roughly 50 percent are outliers. The mean absolute residual is larger than
in the non-distressed cluster. In 1999, the threshold is 2 ∗ 0.50 = 1.00 and also 50
percent of the distressed cities are outliers. The mean absolute residual is higher in
the distressed cluster for all years. As concerns spending, the analysis of residuals
yields similar results. The ﬁt in the distressed cluster is much lower than in the
non-distressed cluster.34
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
distressed cities
debtpc 75 4482.3 2827.5 2775.7 24682.9
debt per capita growth 75 1.6 4.9 -0.6 40.1
mean income n.a.
income growth n.a.
population growth 75 8.1 12.7 -11.1 55.8
population 75 425934.4 1077344.0 30273.0 8008278.0
expenditure per capita 75 1673.1 956.0 627.0 5612.0
police exp. per capita 75 190.3 97.0 63.7 644.2
highway exp. per capita 75 22.4 16.2 0.9 68.5
sewerage expenditure per capita 75 175.0 101.8 12.1 487.0
residuals spending 75 0.29 0.26 0.00 1.36
residuals debt 75 0.93 0.56 0.00 2.68
tax per capita 75 648.4 407.9 90.8 2418.5
intergov’t grants per capita 75 464.0 543.8 67.6 2283.5
interest as percent of expenditure 75 11.8 8.6 2.0 50.8
non-distressed cities
debtpc 517 1175.6 645.4 2.9 2714.1
debt per capita growth 517 1.4 8.2 -1.0 136.6
mean income n.a.
income growth n.a.
population growth 517 10.0 14.8 -21.4 140.8
population 517 107449.2 119288.9 25514.0 1321045.0
expenditure per capita 517 1091.2 601.9 301.0 4130.0
police exp. per capita 517 147.4 56.9 44.1 571.7
highway exp. per capita 517 22.9 12.8 -49.5 70.7
sewerage expenditure per capita 503 127.1 74.3 0.8 594.2
residuals spending 517 0.19 0.17 0.00 1.04
residuals debt 517 0.48 0.46 0.00 5.58
tax per capita 517 457.8 273.7 53.7 2070.2
intergov’t grants per capita 517 321.8 399.8 9.5 2929.0
interest as percent of expenditure 516 5.2 3.8 0.0 26.0
Table 7: Summary statistics of cities in the crises and the non-crises cluster in 1999.
5.2 Robustness check
As a further robustness-check we identiﬁed distressed cities as the upper 2 percentile
of the distribution of debt per capita (see Tables 8 - 10). This allows to compare
the 13 cities with the highest per capita debt with all the other cities. Again the
diﬀerence in average debt is roughly between 5 and 10 fold. In 1985, income per
capita in the two groups is roughly the same, also income growth in the preceding
years is similar.43 Population growth in the high debt group is higher at 13 percent
in the last 5 years, compared to 7.7 percent in the low debt cluster, while average
population size is the same in the two groups. Expenditure per capita is higher in
the distressed group. Of the 13 cities ten cities have an absolute mean error of the
residuals of the debt regressions larger than the threshold of two standard deviations.
Thus, the debt levels of these cities are not well explained by the regression analysis.
43The cities in 1985 are: Corona, CA; Pittsburg, CA; Pomona, CA; Gainesville, FL; Lakeland,
FL; Orlando, FL; Bowling Green, KY; Lafayette, LA; Owensboro, KY; Burnsville, MN; Minneapo-
lis, MN; Farmington, NM; Galveston, TX.35
Similarly spending levels are not well explained for the distressed cities. Public
employment in the two groups does not diﬀer much, as a single factor it therefore
can not explain the diﬀerences in ﬁscal outcomes. For the later years, a similar
picture emerges, the regression ﬁt is quite bad for the cities with high debt levels.44
In 2000, the composition of cities changes quite dramatically, as New York and San
Francisco now belong to the 2 percent of cities with the highest debt burden per
capita.45 As a result, the average population size jumps and distressed cities are
now 6 times as large as the other cities. Looking at the ﬁve percent upper tail of
2 percent 5 percent
distressed cities 13 cities 32 cities
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
debt per capita 7732.6 7008.1 4914.1 4975.7
mean income 10560.4 1672.0 11222.0 4583.4
income growth 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
population growth 13.0 11.6 12.3 13.8
population 90792.3 86358.3 134253.1 184434.9
expenditure per capita 1138.2 541.8 908.9 529.6
police exp. Per capita 85.6 23.7 81.7 53.8
highway exp. Per capita 70.5 53.7 73.0 47.7
sewerage expenditure per capita 114.9 83.0 101.8 69.9
tax per capita 226.5 67.2 244.9 186.8
intergov’t grants per capita 142.5 96.3 135.3 82.2
residuals spending 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4
residuals debt 1.5 0.7 1.3 0.7
public employment per capita 156.1 83.7 136.0 73.6
non-distressed cities 579 cities 560 cities
debt per capita 836.5 657.3 763.6 526.2
mean income 11190.4 2753.2 11174.0 2596.5
income growth 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
population growth 7.7 12.8 7.5 12.7
population 130756.9 380038.5 129629.4 384248.8
expenditure per capita 626.1 339.5 621.8 333.8
police exp. Per capita 79.3 32.3 79.3 30.5
highway exp. Per capita 59.7 35.3 59.2 34.8
sewerage expenditure per capita 78.0 64.0 77.5 64.1
tax per capita 270.1 170.9 270.5 168.4
intergov’t grants per capita 173.0 165.7 174.5 167.8
residuals spending 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
residuals debt 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5
public employment per capita 140.8 93.0 141.4 93.8
Table 8: Summary statistics of cities in the crises and the non-crises group, 2 and 5
percent upper tail of the distribution in 1985.
the distribution, the results are conﬁrmed. The predictive power of the structural
44The high debt cities in 1994 are: Fontana, CA; Paramount, CA; Pleasant Hill, CA; Pleasan-
ton, CA; Lakeland, FL; Orlando, FL; Bowling Green, KY; Burnsville, MN; Minneapolis, MN;
Farmington, NM; Hamilton, OH; Harrisburg, PA, Austin, TX.
45The high debt cities in 2000 are: Beverly Hills, CA; Brea, CA; Denver, CO; San Francisco,
CA; Lakeland, FL; Owensboro, KY; Kalamazoo, MI; St. Louis Park, MN, Farmington, NM; New
York, NY; Fairﬁeld, OH; Hamilton, OH; Austin, TX.36
2 percent 5 percent
distressed cities 13 cities 32 cities
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
debt per capita 8495.5 5347.4 5970.2 3963.6
mean income 14538.2 4560.9 14902.3 4064.2
income growth 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
population growth 20.2 32.0 13.3 27.9
population 121976.8 142948.7 377726.0 1280458.0
expenditure per capita 1373.7 839.3 1426.4 896.3
police exp. Per capita 123.5 35.1 145.1 62.2
highway exp. Per capita 95.6 36.0 108.3 74.0
sewerage expenditure per capita 163.9 120.3 159.2 105.8
tax per capita 321.7 104.8 485.7 405.3
intergov’t grants per capita 163.0 146.1 236.9 348.7
residuals spending 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
residuals debt 1.7 0.9 1.4 0.8
public employment per capita 129.3 75.6 148.7 112.7
interest as percent of expenditure 25.0 17.3 21.3 13.5
non-distressed cities 579 cities 560 cities
debt per capita 1164.3 932.6 1059.9 747.5
mean income 14417.8 4429.1 14392.9 4449.7
income growth 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
population growth 8.8 16.2 8.8 15.8
population 136056.3 381546.4 121919.7 237699.3
expenditure per capita 941.2 537.7 923.5 510.0
police exp. Per capita 117.9 51.1 116.5 49.7
highway exp. Per capita 79.9 48.3 78.7 45.8
sewerage expenditure per capita 111.5 77.1 110.0 75.9
tax per capita 391.4 258.2 384.4 244.1
intergov’t grants per capita 232.8 270.9 231.0 264.1
residuals spending 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
residuals debt 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
public employment per capita 134.6 88.1 133.7 86.2
interest as percent of expenditure 7.5 6.8 7.1 6.4
Table 9: Summary statistics of cities in the crises and the non-crises group, 2 and 5
percent upper tail of the distribution in 1991.
model is lower for the distressed cities. Diﬀerences in structural factors are of minor
importance.46
Thus, while part of the high debt burden in the ”crisis cluster” can be explained
by structural factors, a considerable part of the outcome is left unexplained by
structural factors. Similarly, the regression analysis explains the spending decisions
of the distressed cluster far worse than the non-distressed cluster. There appears
to be a large non-structural component to a crisis. The common pool model of
municipal spending and debt does not explain extreme ﬁscal outcomes well.
Our results are in line with the result of case studies, which emphasize non-
structural factors like negotiation power of public employees/unionization (the case
of New York and also Philadelphia), excessively high social security programs be-
46Remarkably, New York belongs to the upper 5 percent high debt level cities already in 1991,
which increases the average size of distressed cities37
2 percent 5 percent
distressed cities 13 cities 32 cities
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
debt per capita 8606.1 5002.2 6102.1 3772.3
mean income na
income growth na
population growth 8.0 9.5 7.2 10.1
population 804601.8 2181070.0 439825.8 1405980.0
expenditure per capita 2269.6 1641.0 1938.9 1252.4
police exp. Per capita 245.4 157.1 210.1 118.9
highway exp. Per capita 119.7 72.6 110.8 61.4
sewerage expenditure per capita 207.0 121.5 188.0 115.4
tax per capita 800.8 725.4 724.6 537.9
intergov’t grants per capita 495.0 716.1 514.2 618.8
residuals spending 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
residuals debt 1.7 0.6 1.2 0.6
public employment per capita na
interest as percent of expenditure 17.1 14.1 13.5 11.0
non-distressed cities 579 cities 560 cities
debt per capita 1437.1 992.2 1337.0 839.8
mean income na
income growth na
population growth 9.8 14.7 9.9 14.8
population 133051.0 253204.5 131110.5 252751.4
expenditure per capita 1140.1 628.3 1120.7 609.8
police exp. Per capita 150.7 59.9 149.5 58.8
highway exp. Per capita 93.9 52.3 93.5 52.2
sewerage expenditure per capita 131.6 78.1 130.1 76.3
tax per capita 474.8 281.2 468.1 275.4
intergov’t grants per capita 336.3 414.3 329.8 407.4
residuals spending 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
residuals debt 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
public employment per capita na
interest as percent of expenditure 5.8 4.5 5.6 4.2
Table 10: Summary statistics of cities in the crises and the non-crises group, 2 and
5 percent upper tail of the distribution in 1999.
cause of political preferences of the mayor (New York: John Lindsay in the 1960s,
for Philadelphia see Inman (1995)) as determinants of excessive spending, debt and
ultimately crisis. Miranda (1994) for example investigates the importance of strong
party organization (SPO) to impose ﬁscal discipline. SPO allows the mayor to be
more independent of the inﬂuence of interest groups and thus ensure total ﬁscal
discipline. Thus, ﬁscal distress and crisis has a large non-structural element.38
6 Conclusions
Why do some US cities experience a ﬁscal crisis and others do not? This paper pro-
poses an indirect approach in comparing and assessing the relevance of economic and
socio-demographic (structural) factors on the one side and non-structural (manage-
ment and political) factors on the other hand. We ask the question whether cities
are in distress, and therefore likely to experience a crisis, because of measurable
structural factors or because of other factors.
In a ﬁrst step we present a common pool resource model. The model shows
that municipal expenditure is caused by simple demand factors like income per
capita, the population size and the value of the tax base and in addition by factors
measuring the possible degree of the common pool problem, like employment per
capita, poverty, birth rates, percentage of seniors, hispanics and crime rates. All
these factors are measurable structural factors. The common pool model further
predicts that debt levels are higher the worse the common pool problem is.
We test this model in a regression analysis explaining municipal expenditure.
The model is able to explain more than 90 percent of the cross city variation in
municipal spending. The coeﬃcients are shown to change little from 1985 to 1991
and 1997. Thus, municipal spending is a result of measurable structural factors.
Similarly, we show that municipal debt levels are determined by the same common
pool factors. However, the explained variance is lower at around 67 percent.
Cities in ﬁscal distress are identiﬁed by means of a cluster analysis. The criterion
for distress are high debt levels. It is shown that distressed cities can be characterized
by debt levels 10 times as high as the average debt level. Spending is around
twice as high. However, the socio-demographic and economic factors of distressed
cities appear to have fairly average values. Spending and debt levels of distressed
cities can not be well explained by the common pool model of spending and debt.
They constitute outliers in the regression analysis. Thus, the structural, measured
factors can only to a limited degree account for their speciﬁc debt and spending
outcomes. We therefore conclude that distress and ultimately crisis is a result of
non-structural factors. This is in line with political research on individual cities
in distress. These studies often emphasize the role of strong party organization
(Miranda 1994), dependence of the mayor on support from interest groups and the
like. Fiscal crisis thus appears to have a large non-structural component, socio-
demographic and economic factors can not account for extreme ﬁscal outcomes.
Future research should investigate the interactions between political factors and
economic factors and their relevance for ﬁscal crisis. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003),
e.g., study the eﬀect of mayors appealing on feelings of strong minorities (in their39
example the Irish) that a mayor of the minority can better represent their interest,
with bad consequences for the local economy. How is ﬁscal outcome aﬀected by
these and other political factors?
An additional avenue for future research concerns intergovernmental relations
and their eﬀect on crises. Inman (2001) argues that the American system is rather
successful in preventing cities from receiving bail-outs. The moral hazard issue thus
seems to be solved. However, it remains to be investigated whether intergovern-
mental transfer rules can be improved in such a way as to prevent crisis and not
to fall in the trap of moral hazard problems. A further extension of this line of
research would look at the eﬀects of an increased number of local authorities on
ﬁscal outcomes. Our research suggest that consolidation of schooling and health
services in the municipal budget leads to lower spending for other services. Are
crises more likely to occur in smaller public authorities with a limited number of
responsibilities? Or does, on the contrary, consolidation of all local responsibilities
in one authority increase the likelihood of crises?40
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Name FIPS FIPS Name FIPS FIPS
State State State State
Numeric Alpha Numeric Alpha
Code Code Code Code
Alabama 1 AL Missouri 29 MO
Alaska 2 AK Montana 30 MT
Arizona 4 AZ Nebraska 31 NE
Arkansas 5 AR Nevada 32 NV
California 6 CA New Hampshire 33 NH
Colorado 8 CO New Jersey 34 NJ
Connecticut 9 CT New Mexico 35 NM
Delaware 10 DE New York 36 NY
District of 11 DC North Carolina 37 NC
Columbia North Dakota 38 ND
Florida 12 FL Ohio 39 OH
Georgia 13 GA Oklahoma 40 OK
Oregon 41 OR
Hawaii 15 HI Pennsylvania 42 PA
Idaho 16 ID Rhode Island 44 RI
Illinois 17 IL South Carolina 45 SC
Indiana 18 IN South Dakota 46 SD
Iowa 19 IA Tennessee 47 TN
Kansas 20 KS Texas 48 TX
Kentucky 21 KY Utah 49 UT
Louisiana 22 LA Vermont 50 VT
Maine 23 ME Virginia 51 VA
Maryland 24 MD Washington 53 WA
Massachusetts 25 MA West Virginia 54 WV
Michigan 26 MI Wisconsin 55 WI
Minnesota 27 MN Wyoming 56 WY
Mississippi 28 MS
Table 11: FIPS State codes for the States and the District of Columbia47
1 2 3 4 5
log (income per capita) 0.77 0.62 0.73 0.85 0.58
0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.08
log(population) 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
log(median house value) -0.14 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
own house -0.26 -0.25 -0.28 -0.45 -0.21
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12
school 0.05 0.05 0.33 0.33 0.33
0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07
health 0.35 0.34 0.51 0.50 0.51
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
grant per capita 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
employment per capita 0.71 0.83 0.99 1.02
0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22
income growth -0.73
0.28
hispanic -0.22 -0.20 -0.23 -0.21 -0.29
0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
seniors 0.57 0.69 0.94 0.81 1.15
0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.24
birth 8.21 8.37 8.74 6.05 9.84
2.61 2.61 2.74 2.70 2.68
crime 1.75 1.78 2.71 2.87 2.84
0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.46
poverty 1.18 0.99 1.30 1.04 1.33
0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33
central 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
public employment per capita 20.56 20.45
2.19 2.20
constant -14.42 -13.24 -14.04 -14.25 -14.27
0.89 0.77 0.80 0.81 0.80
state-dummies yes yes yes yes yes
R2 adjusted 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92
Obs 943 943 943 943 943
Table 12: Determinants of general municipal expenditure, 1984-85. Standard errors
are reported below the coeﬃcient.48
1994 a 1994 b 1994 c 1994 d 2000 a 2000 b pooled 1 pooled 2
log(income per capita) 0.69 0.73 0.57
0.13 0.12 0.12
log(population) 1.08 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.08
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
population growth 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.002
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
population density -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
log(median house value) -0.09 -0.08 -0.04
0.07 0.07 0.07
own house -0.35 -0.55 -0.53 -0.45 -0.53 -0.48 -0.49 -0.55
0.13 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.08
school 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.01 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48
0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.05
health 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.28 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.57
0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04
grant per capita 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00




hispanic -0.52 0.14 0.13 0.08 -0.64 -0.60 -0.56 -0.48
0.11 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06
seniors 0.97 1.16 1.10 0.81 0.71 0.46 1.02 0.91
0.33 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.27 0.27 0.16 0.16
birth 8.73 8.52 7.59
2.92 2.88 2.76
crime 2.69 2.49 2.52 1.71 3.34 2.94 2.92 2.75
0.49 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.75 0.76 0.28 0.28
poverty 1.03 1.06 0.66
0.32 0.32 0.31
central 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
public employment per capita 22.36
2.59
constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time dummies no no no no no no yes yes
obs 867 867 867 867 612 611 2422 2421
R2 0.89 0.9 0.9 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91
Table 13: Determinants of general municipal expenditure, comparison of the diﬀer-
ent years for largest available number of cities. Standard errors are reported below
the coeﬃcient.49
1985 1991 1999
a b c d a b c d a
log(income per capita) 0.55 0.71 0.08 0.24
0.41 0.41 0.37 0.37
log(population) 1.16 1.17 1.16 1.19 1.25 1.24 1.26 1.27 1.18
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
population growth 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
population density -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
log(median house value) -0.17 -0.19 -0.18 -0.24
0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21
own house -0.53 -0.72 -0.96 -0.20 -0.24 -0.44 0.12
0.46 0.46 0.35 0.49 0.49 0.37 0.39
school -0.67 -0.18 -0.70 -0.15 -0.64 -0.30 -0.64 -0.23 0.21
0.26 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.26
health 0.05 0.34 0.03 0.32 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.33 0.18
0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.20
grant per capita 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.04
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
employment per capita 1.89 2.22 2.63 2.24 2.90 1.85
1.03 1.04 0.84 1.01 1.00 0.78
income growth -1.55 -1.47 -0.90 0.79 0.81 0.49
0.94 0.95 0.76 0.50 0.51 0.42
hispanic 0.12 0.19 -0.09 0.34 0.41 -0.05 -0.22
0.41 0.42 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.32 0.26
seniors -0.53 0.02 -0.06 -0.96 -0.50 -1.43 -1.72
0.92 0.93 0.80 1.03 1.03 0.88 1.08
birth 2.00 2.19 10.50 12.79
9.15 9.26 8.56 8.60
crime 1.08 2.67 1.42 3.33 2.28 3.15 2.77 3.86 3.77
1.53 1.51 1.46 1.41 1.37 1.35 1.33 1.31 1.79
poverty 1.69 2.12 1.68 0.92 1.50 1.38
1.14 1.15 0.77 0.92 0.91 0.66
central 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.26
0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
public employment per capita 35.70 37.19 27.33 26.65
7.50 7.31 7.78 7.57
constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 930 930 930 930 859 859 859 860 646
R2 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.67
Table 14: Determinants of municipal debt. Standard errors are reported below the
coeﬃcient.2008
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